Fiscal illusion and cyclical government expenditure: State government expenditure in the United States by Abbott, Andrew. & Jones, Philip.
Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: 
State Government Expenditure in the USA  
Andrew Abbotta,*, Philip Jonesb 
a University of Hull, Business School, Hull, UK 
b University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath, UK 
* corresponding author. Andrew Abbott, Business School, University of Hull, Cottingham Road,
Hull, HU6 7RX, UK. Tel: +44(0) 1482 463570, fax: +44(0) 1482 463484. 
E-mail addresses: a.abbott@hull.ac.uk (A. Abbott), p.r.jones@bath.ac.uk (P. Jones) 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Abbott, A. and Jones, P. (2016), 
Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the 
United States. Scott J Polit Econ, 63: 177–193, which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12095.  This article may be used for non-commercial purposes 
in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: 
State Government Expenditure in the USA* 
 
Abstract 
A well-established literature argues that fiscal illusion increases the level of 
government expenditure. This paper focuses on the proposition that fiscal illusion also 
influences the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are formed with reference to 
government reliance on high income-elasticities of indirect tax revenues and on 
intergovernmental transfers. Predictions are tested with reference to the expenditures of 36 
states in the USA from 1980 to 2000. Government expenditures are more likely to be 
procyclical when citizens systematically under-estimate the cost of taxation. 
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1. Introduction. 
Procyclical public expenditure increases as national income increases and falls as national income 
decreases. Economists usually anticipate counter-cyclical expenditure (Alesina et al., 2008), but 
empirical studies increasingly report procyclical expenditure (Gavin et al., 1996; Talvi and Végh, 
2005; Alesina et al., 2008; Woo, 2009; Abbott and Jones, 2013). Studies that explain procyclical 
expenditure highlight the relevance of political pressures for public expenditure. The likelihood of 
procyclical expenditure increases if there are ‘voracity effects’, i.e. if political pressures to raise public 
expenditure increase as national income increases and fall as national income falls (Lane and Tornell, 
1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999). Empirical studies indicate that political pressure to increase public 
expenditure is a significant determinant of procyclical expenditure (Lane, 2003; Abbott and Jones, 
2013). 
This paper focuses on the way that the intensity of pressures to increase government 
expenditure changes over the economic cycle. The intensity of political pressure is gauged with 
reference to politicians’ willingness to increase expenditure to win votes (Downs, 1957). Pressure is 
intense when politicians believe they are able to increase expenditure without alarming voters that 
taxation will increase.  
A well-established literature focuses on the circumstances in which voters are likely to 
under-estimate taxation systematically.1 This literature has focused on the level of government 
expenditure. In this paper, the objective is to introduce and explore the proposition that fiscal illusion 
is also likely to increase the cyclicality of government expenditure.  
When focusing on the cyclicality of government expenditure, some of the sources of fiscal 
illusion are likely to be more relevant than others. In the next section of the paper, the intention is to 
review the many sources of fiscal illusion. Studies that have tested the reasons why voters 
underestimate taxation have focused on variables that capture the extent to which individuals are 
likely to underestimate taxation. For example, one of these variables is the complexity of the tax 
system. Studies test the significance of these sources of fiscal illusion separately. In the case of tax 
                                                          
1 Oates (1988), Dollery and Worthington (1996) and Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012) have surveyed this 
literature. 
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complexity, they test the proposition that adding a single variable (to measure tax complexity) to the 
socio-economic variables that are likely to influence the level of government spending, will reveal 
that tax complexity is a significant determinant of the level of taxation. In this paper, a first attempt 
(to our knowledge) will be made to assess the relative importance of all of these different sources of 
fiscal illusion on the level of government expenditure. The intention is to add this full complement of 
variables (variables that are said to be relevant when considering different sources of fiscal illusion) to 
the socio-economic variables that are likely to influence the level of government spending, in order to 
compare the impact that they exert on the level of government spending. 2 
In section three of the paper attention focuses on two sources of fiscal illusion that are likely to 
be particularly relevant when considering the level and the cyclicality of government expenditure. 
These sources of fiscal illusion are more important when national income is increasing. If politicians 
are myopic in economic upturns (Downs, 1957) they are likely to indulge pressures to increase 
government expenditure with little regard for the difficulties they will face when the economy moves 
into recession. If fiscal illusion increases as national income increases, fiscal illusion increases the 
likelihood that there will be ‘voracity effects’. How relevant are these sources of fiscal illusion when 
national income is increasing? How relevant are these sources of fiscal illusion when anticipating that 
governments will spend procyclically?  
If politicians indulge lobby-group pressures to increase public expenditure in an economic 
upturn, the pressures they face to sustain expenditure in a recession will depend on the extent to which 
governments are able to borrow. In this paper, predictions (presented in sections two and three of the 
paper) are tested with reference to the level and the cyclicality of government expenditures in 36 
states of the USA between 1980 and 2000 (because subnational governments find it more difficult to 
                                                          
2 Dell’Anno and Dollery (2014) employed a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model (that relies on the main 
indicators of fiscal illusion) to consider the relative importance of determinants of fiscal illusion. They 
discovered “ …the chief determinants for the deployment of fiscal illusion strategies are the share of self–
employment on total employment, the educational level of citizens, and the size of tax burden” (p. 937). In this 
paper the approach is quite different. Here the approach is to assess the relative impact of alternative sources of 
fiscal illusion on the level of government spending. It is a new approach to the extent that it includes the full 
complement of the sources described in this paper.  
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borrow in a recession).3 Section four of the paper describes the dataset and the models used to test 
predictions. The results are presented in section five. Conclusions and policy implications are 
discussed in the final section of the paper. 
 
2. Fiscal Illusion and the Level of Public Expenditure.  
An established literature has identified the circumstances in which voters are likely to under-estimate 
the costs of taxation. When testing for fiscal illusion, variables are chosen to proxy the likelihood that 
there is fiscal illusion. As Oates (1988) explains, the hypothesis is that E (an estimate of budgetary 
size) depends on: X (a vector of variables that includes income, tax-price, and socio-demographic 
variables that proxy for tastes and preferences); F (a variable that makes it difficult for voters to 
estimate tax costs) and u (an error term). If the coefficient β in equation (1) is significant, E is higher 
than would be predicted with reference to X: 
E = αX + βF + u      (1) 
In this literature, the determinants of fiscal illusion are: 
 
(i)   A complex tax system: Wagner (1976) argued that complexity is the important consideration. In 
Wagner’s study, the vector F in equation (1) comprises a single variable, S. With Ri equal to the share 
of revenues generated from each of n tax categories (e.g. property taxes; general sales taxes; charges 
and fees),
 
. The Herfindahl index achieves its maximum value (of unity) when a jurisdiction 
generates all of its own revenues from a single source. The minimum possible value is when revenues 
are divided equally across n different tax categories. Tax systems are not as complex the higher the 
value of the index. In Wagner’s regression, S was significantly negative (suggesting that expenditure 
is lower the simpler the tax structure). Wagner could reject the null hypothesis of non-association at a 
                                                          
3 Oates (1972) insisted that central government should retain responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization 
(because central government actions are more productive). Sub-central government spending is less effective. If 
sub-central governments were to rely on deficit spending they would be forced to compete with one another 
(e.g. by paying higher interest rates to attract loanable funds). If one local jurisdiction attempted to reduce local 
unemployment it would have very little success because (with open trade between jurisdictions) the multiplier is 
very low. Rodden (2002) describes the borrowing constraints that are faced by subnational governments.  
S Ri
i
n
=
=
∑ 2
1
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0.01 level of significance. 
 
(ii)   Renter illusion: Renter illusion occurs when local taxes are levied on the owners of property and 
not on their tenants. In these circumstances, tenants believe that the costs of government expenditure 
are low (even if taxes are shifted forward in rent charges). It follows that the larger the number of 
renters in a jurisdiction, the higher the level of government expenditure (other things equal). There is 
evidence that local jurisdictions tend to spend more per capita on local public services when there is a 
relatively large fraction of citizens who rent accommodation (see, for example, Bergstrom and 
Goodman, 1973; Peterson, 1975). Tenants fail to understand the link between levels of local spending 
and the level of rent that they pay. Once again, the F-vector in equation (1) is usually a single variable 
(the proportion of residents in a jurisdiction who rent accommodation).  
 
(iii)   High Income-elasticities of Tax Revenue: Oates (1975) introduced the argument that high 
income-elasticities of tax revenue are likely to increase fiscal illusion. When national income 
increases, taxes increase the share of income spent in the public sector. Tax awareness is lower when 
there are forces in the economy that automatically increase government revenue (without any formal 
need to introduce a new tax or to change the tax rate). With a progressive tax rate structure, an 
increase in national income increases tax revenue and politicians have no reason to bring this to the 
attention of taxpayers. The empirical literature, focusing only on the impact of high 
income-elasticities of tax revenue, is mixed. Oates (1975) drew attention to a positive relationship 
between high income-elasticities of tax revenues and increases in the growth of government 
expenditure. Craig and Heins’ (1980:267) reported a positive relationship between high income-
elasticities of tax revenue and high levels of government expenditure. They supported“…the idea that 
elasticity drives spending”. Craig and Heins focused on the impact of estimates of elasticities 
provided by the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations in 1976-77. They reported a 
statistically significant positive relationship for 1970 and 1975. Di Lorenzo (1982) and Feenberg and 
Rosen (1987) did not find a significant relationship between higher income-elasticities of tax revenue 
and higher levels of public sector spending. 
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 (vi)   Flypaper Effects. There is a ‘flypaper effect’ if sub-central government expenditure is higher 
than anticipated when sub-central governments receive lump sum intergovernmental transfers. When 
money moves in the public sector, money is spent in the public sector (‘money sticks where it hits’). 
The ‘flypaper effect’ was first identified by Gramlich and Galper (1973), but many other studies have 
subsequently reported its existence (Hines and Thaler (1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1998) survey 
this literature). While there are many different explanations for the existence of the ‘flypaper effect’, 
local voters appear to under-estimate the full costs of public expenditure when a local jurisdiction is in 
receipt of intergovernmental transfers (Oates, 1979).4 In this instance the F-vector would consist of a 
single variable that measures local jurisdictions’ reliance on intergovernmental transfers. 
 
(v)   Public Debt Illusion. If voters ignore future tax liabilities, government borrowing appears to 
reduce the costs of taxation. Vickrey (1961:133) refers to “... "a public debt illusion" …(when)… 
individuals pay no attention to their share in the liability represented by the public debt ...”. Buchanan 
and Wagner (1977:142) argue that “…events of fiscal history strongly support the hypothesis that 
unconstrained access to public borrowing will tend to generate excessive public spending”. Once 
again, there is fiscal illusion if a single variable (as a proxy of government borrowing) is significant 
(e.g. Kormendi, 1985).  
 
For each hypothesis, the empirical evidence is mixed.5 Surveys of the literature on fiscal 
illusion are critical of tests that have been employed. A first concern is that the proxies employed to 
measure fiscal illusion are far from perfect. When focusing on complexity, and when focusing on 
income-elasticities of tax revenue, some taxes are simply more transparent than others (irrespective of 
                                                          
4 Public choice theory explains the ‘flypaper effect’ with reference to pressure for increased public expenditure. 
A local jurisdiction’s receipt of intergovernmental grants (paid, in part, by others in the country) provides local 
politicians with the opportunity to respond to pressures from: local bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971; Romer and 
Rosenthal, 1980); local interest groups (Dougan and Kenyon, 1988); and local voters (Oates, 1979). However, at 
the heart of this analysis is the argument that voters systematically underestimate the tax-cost of expenditure 
programmes. Voters focus on the average cost of public expenditure, rather than the marginal cost of public 
expenditure. 
5 Not all studies report evidence of fiscal illusion (e.g. Gemmell et al., 2003), and in some studies there is also 
evidence that voters underestimate public expenditure (e.g. Cullis and Jones, 1987). 
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the Herfindahl Index, or the size of the income-elasticity of tax revenue). It has long been argued that 
taxpayers are likely to know less about indirect taxes than they know about direct taxes. John Stuart 
Mill ([1848] 1994) argued: “If all taxes were direct, taxation would be much more perceived than at 
present, and there would be a security, which now there is not, for economy in the public expenditure” 
(cited in Dell’ Anno and Mourāo, 2012: 272).6 In this study, the intention is to distinguish between the 
impact exerted by high income-elasticities of direct tax revenue and the impact exerted by high 
income-elasticities of indirect tax revenue.  
A second criticism endemic in this literature is that OLS regressions are not able to deal with 
the problem of endogeneity. Oates (1988) is critical that it might not be an increase in fiscal illusion 
(proxied by variables chosen to capture fiscal illusion) that increases government expenditure. 
Instead, plans to increase government expenditure might explain reliance on variables used to proxy 
fiscal illusion. For example, governments that anticipate an increased demand for public expenditure 
might chose to rely on a wider diversity of taxes (a more complex system) to lower the excess burden 
associated with increased taxation. Also, local jurisdictions (that anticipate that voters will demand 
greater expenditure as income increases) might choose to rely on tax systems that have high income-
elasticities of tax revenue, in order to reduce the transactions costs of continually increasing tax rates 
in the future. In this paper, the intention is to deal with the problem of endogeneity by instrumenting 
changes in income and federal aid. 
To date, studies have focused on each single source of fiscal illusion.7 In this paper, it is 
important to test the relative influence of different causes of fiscal illusion, because (as will be argued 
in the next section) some determinants are likely to be more important than others when focusing on 
the cyclicality of public expenditure. Here the objective is to offer a first test of the relative 
                                                          
6 Buchanan (1967) argued that a sales tax creates fiscal illusion because it is absorbed in the payments citizens 
make for private goods and services. Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) argued that indirect taxation is less visible 
than direct taxation. Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Dollery and Worthington (1996) and Dell’Anno and 
Mourāo (2012) report evidence that public spending is higher (other things equal) if governments rely on 
indirect taxation. When Oates (1999:2) considered the optimal tax for sub-central governments, he argued that: 
“…sales taxes do not get very good marks on a fairness or ability-to-pay criterion. In addition, they do not stack 
up at all well on the public-choice criterion of providing the electorate with accurate and visible signals of the 
costs of public programs”. (Oates was aware of the argument that property taxes might create fiscal illusion but 
he was more concerned with the obfuscation created by sales tax). 
7 Mourāo (2008) has complied a fiscal illusion index to capture the influence of more than one source of fiscal 
illusion, but in this paper the objective is to compare the relative impact of different sources of fiscal illusion.   
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importance of these determinants of fiscal illusion, controlling for the problem of endogeneity.  
 
3. Fiscal illusion and the Cyclicality of government expenditure. 
Pressures to increase public expenditure are more intense when politicians believe that they are able to 
win votes (by increasing public expenditure) without alarming voters of any increase in taxation. 
Downs (1957) argued that politicians focus myopically on electoral payoffs over a four- or five-year 
electoral interval. If fiscal illusion increases as national income increases, politicians ‘sow the seeds’ 
of problems they will face in recessions. The more that fiscal illusion increases as national income 
increases, the greater the likelihood that there will be ‘voracity effects’. 
Two sources of fiscal illusion are particularly sensitive to changes in national income: (i) high 
income-elasticities of sales taxes and (ii) receipts of intergovernmental transfers. When governments 
rely on high income-elasticities of indirect tax, it is not simply the case that they will not need to 
introduce a new tax (or a new tax rate), it is also the case they can remain more at ease that the 
electorate will also not be aware of the increase in tax that they are paying automatically as national 
income increases.  
 Abbott and Jones (2013) have shown that intergovernmental transfers are often procyclical. 
They argue that politicians at federal government are more likely to increase intergovernmental 
transfers when national income is increasing. When national income is falling, federal governments 
are more constrained by falling tax revenues. When national income is falling, politicians at federal 
government are also more mindful that there are pressures to increase ‘direct’ federal government 
expenditure on health, education, defence, social security etc. These expenditures are more 
transparent than intergovernmental transfers. At federal government, politicians are mindful that they 
will win votes if they persuade voters they are able to manage the economy (e.g. Jones and Hudson, 
1996). As they are under pressure to increase ‘direct’ expenditures in an economic downturn, they are 
less receptive to pressures for intergovernmental transfers in an economic downturn. With this mix of 
incentives and constraints, political pressures for intergovernmental transfers are more successful in 
economic upturns than in economic downturns.  
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 In this paper, the argument is that fiscal illusion is likely to increase as income increases, 
because pressures for governmental transfers are more likely to be successful in economic upturns 
than in downturns. Mueller (2003) has argued, local politicians are aware that“...the more the 
government spends holding taxes constant the happier voters are…” and “…the higher the 
probability of incumbent politicians being re-elected” (p.223). With high income-elasticities of sales 
tax revenues and with heavy reliance on intergovernmental transfers, politicians in sub-central 
governments are more likely to act indulgently when national income is increasing.  
 Other things equal: 
 
(i) high income-elasticities of indirect tax revenue and reliance on intergovernmental 
transfers increase the level of sub-central government expenditures; 
 
(ii) high income-elasticities of indirect tax revenue increase the likelihood of procyclical 
government expenditure;  
 
(iii) reliance on intergovernmental transfers increases the likelihood of procyclical 
government expenditure. 
 
 
4. Fiscal Illusion and Sub-Central Government Expenditures in the USA.  
To test the extent to which fiscal illusion impacts on the level of government spending, we can adapt 
the model of Craig and Heins (1980) as follows:  
  (2) 
where: 
G is state current government spending per capita;  
Y is state personal income per capita;  
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F is federal aid per capita;  
A is the percentage of population aged over 65 years;  
C is the percentage of the population that lives in an urban area;  
S is the proportion of revenues originating at the state level;  
B is state borrowing as a proportion of GDP; 
D is total state debt outstanding as a proportion of GDP; 
GI is the Gini index of income inequality;  
ID is a measure of state government ideology; 
NW is the proportion of the population that is non-white; 
SE is the income elasticity of state sales tax revenue; 
PIE is the income elasticity of state personal income tax revenue; 
RHF is a Herfindahl index of state revenue proportions; 
OWN is the rate of owner occupation 
 
This model differs from the original Craig and Heins (1980) specification in a number of respects. 
Firstly, A covers the population aged 65 years and over, rather than the population aged 18 and over, 
because this is now a more significant driver of state spending. Secondly, population density is no 
longer included because it has a strong association with the proportion of the state population that 
lives in an urban area. Thirdly, we add a number of control variables not previously considered, which 
could be important in influencing the level of government spending, such as state ideology (measured 
between 0 for ‘conservative’ and 100 for ‘liberal’) and the proportion of non-white population (e.g. 
Facchini, 2014). Fourthly, fiscal illusion is measured through six alternative approaches: the rate of 
owner occupation (OWN), which inversely picks up the proportion of renters; the Herfindahl index of 
state revenue proportions (RHF); the percentage of revenue originating locally (S); the amount of 
state borrowing (B) and the total stock of debt (D); the income-elasticities of sales tax (SE) and 
personal income taxation (PIE). We rely on more recent estimates of tax elasticities in Bruce et al. 
(2006), rather than the estimates available in the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations 
used by Craig and Heins (1980). Through including six proxies for fiscal illusion we hope to establish 
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whether a consistent pattern of fiscal illusion emerges, or whether one proxy emerges as being 
particularly significant for determining government spending. Except for the coefficients for RHF and 
for OWN, the expectation is that all of the estimated coefficients will be positive. 
 Government spending per capita, the proportion of revenue originating at state level, borrowing 
for each state and the total stock of outstanding debt are available in the Annual Survey of State 
Government Finances. We also use the same source to calculate the Herfindahl index of revenue 
sources. The population data for C, A and NW are taken from the US Census Bureau along with the 
Gini coefficient data for income inequality and the rate of owner occupation. The personal income per 
capita series is derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our measure of political ideology is 
the NOMINATE measure of state government ideology (Berry et al., 2010). Federal aid per capita 
data is available from the US Office of Management Budget. The estimates of income elasticities are 
provided by Bruce et al. (2006) for Personal Income Taxes and for Sales Taxes (based on tax base 
data between 1967 and 2000). They produced estimates for 48 states but this paper focuses on the 36 
states for which both elasticities are reported (to analyse a consistent sample of states).8 The model is 
a cross-section regression, estimated separately for three years: 1980, 1990 and 2000, in order to test 
the robustness of the model over time. Given the potential for problems of endogeneity we use a 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator that controls for potential endogeneity in personal income 
per capita and federal aid per capita. We instrument state personal income per capita using personal 
income of the US regional division that the US state belongs too. There are nine regional divisions 
used by the US Census Bureau: New England; Mid-Atlantic; East North Central; West North Central; 
South Atlantic; East South Central; West South Central; Mountain; Pacific. By using the regional 
personal income per capita, we control for the impact of economic shocks arising from neighbouring 
states. The instruments for federal aid per capita are urban population; population density; and 
political party coincidence between the state governor and the US president. 
                                                          
8 The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennysylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
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To test the second set of hypotheses, the cyclicality of government spending can be estimated 
as follows (see for example Arena and Revilla (2009) and Lane (2003)) for similar models: 
it
T
2t
tt1it2it11it2it12it21it1iit Dbrbryyggg ε+λ+∆µ+∆µ+∆β+∆β+∆φ+∆φ+α=∆ ∑
=
−−−−  (3) 
where git is the log of government spending per capita for the ith state at period t, y is the log of state 
gross domestic product per capita, while br denotes state government borrowing per capita. We add 
time dummies Dt to account for idiosyncratic time shocks, while εit is a white noise error. The 
dynamic specification of our model allows for potential persistence in git, through the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variables, and for the possibility that government spending might react with a lag in 
response to shocks in GDP or government borrowing. These lagged responses could be due to 
administrative delays or lags caused by delays in the budgetary process. The cyclicality of 
government spending is picked up through the β1 and β2 coefficients, with β1<0 for example 
indicating government spending is counter-cyclical and β1>0 suggesting procyclical behaviour. The 
growth in state borrowing could also be expected to positively influence the growth in government 
spending, so π1 and π2 are expected to be positive. This dynamic panel data model can be estimated 
through the SYS-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). The use of SYS-GMM estimator may 
be limited in this application, since it is expected that the number of time periods are relatively few 
and the number of individual units relatively large. We use data from 1980 to 2000 for these 
estimations. 
 We are also interested in the extent to which the procyclicality varies with the income elasticity 
of tax revenues and the reliance of states on federal government transfers. Investigating the effect of 
the tax elasticity, equation (3) is amended as follows: 
  
( ) ( ) it
T
2t
tti1it1iit1
1it2it11it2it12it21it1iit
DEyEy
brbryyggg
ε+λ+×∆δ+×∆δ+
∆µ+∆µ+∆β+∆β+∆φ+∆φ+α=∆
∑
=
−
−−−−
    (4) 
Where Ei denotes the income elasticity of sales tax revenue or personal income tax revenue. 
Statistically significant interaction term ( )iit Ey ×∆  or ( )i1it Ey ×∆ −  and positively signed 
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coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis that procyclical spending reacts positively to a higher 
income elasticity of tax revenues. 
 To account for the influence of transfers on the cyclicality of spending, we interact the growth 
in federal transfers (∆trit) with the growth in state GDP (∆yit), so that (3) becomes: 
  
( ) ( ) it
T
2t
tt1it1it2itit1
1it2it11it2it12it21it1iit
Dtrytry
brbryyggg
ε+λ+∆×∆ϕ+∆×∆ϕ+
∆µ+∆µ+∆β+∆β+∆φ+∆φ+α=∆
∑
=
−−
−−−−
    (5) 
 
The predictions are that ϕ1 and ϕ2 will be positively signed and the interaction terms will be 
statistically significant. 
 
5. Estimation Results. 
The estimation results from equation (1) are presented in table 1 (for 36 states in 1980, 1990 and 
2000). We find the following: 
(i) Levels of government expenditure and fiscal illusion. Among the six chosen measures of fiscal 
illusion, income elasticity of sales tax revenue has statistical significance. The SE variable is 
statistically significant for the 2000 period and the estimated coefficient is positively signed as 
expected. The fact that the sales tax income elasticity is statistically significant but the personal 
income tax elasticity is not, is important when reflecting on the unresolved debate in the 
literature as to whether or not high income-elasticities of tax revenue increase levels of 
government spending. The results indicate a growing trend in fiscal illusion and suggest that the 
debate is sensitive to differences in the mix of income and sales tax revenues in different tax 
bases. The impact of fiscal illusion is likely to be more obvious the more sub-central 
governments rely on indirect tax revenues. 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE > 
 
(ii) Levels of public expenditure and intergovernmental transfers. In table 1, the federal aid per 
capita series is the most statistically significant control variable and it is signed positively 
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throughout. Own revenues are statistically significant for the 1990 period but the estimated 
coefficient does not have the expected sign. 
 
(iii) Borrowing and the level of public spending. The role of government borrowing across the US 
states is found to have a statistically significant effect on the level of government spending for 
the 1990 period only. In this case, the estimated coefficient has the expected positive sign. In 
contrast, the total stock of outstanding debt is not statistically significant. 
 
(iv) The cyclicality of public expenditure and high income-elasticities of indirect tax revenue. 
Turning to the estimation of the cyclicality of state spending, the estimated cyclicality 
coefficients are reported in table 2. We find that ity∆  is statistically significant and the 
positively-signed coefficient of 0.106 implies a procyclical pattern of spending, albeit with a 
lag. In contrast, the growth in borrowing does not affect the growth in spending. 
<TABLE 2 NEAR HERE > 
 
Whether the income elasticity of sales tax revenue positively influences the procyclical nature 
of public spending can be captured by the interaction terms detailed in (4). The results 
presented in the second and third columns of table (2) show that ( )i1it Ey ×∆ −  is statistically 
significant and the estimated coefficient positively signed as expected. The lagged procyclical 
public spending grows when the illusory impact of taxation is stronger for high incomes. The 
interaction terms are not statistically significant when using the personal income tax elasticity. 
 
(v) The cyclicality of public expenditure and intergovernmental transfers. The results in the final 
column are also consistent with the hypothesis that procyclicality increases with the growth in 
intergovernmental transfers. The estimated coefficient ϕ is positively signed and the interaction 
( )1it1it try −− ∆×∆  is statistically significant. The value of the coefficient is greater than one and 
this is consistent with the hypothesis that the ‘flypaper effect’ can be explained with reference 
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to fiscal illusion. Once again, fiscal illusion increases the procyclicality of government 
expenditures over and above the inherent procyclicality in these sources of governmental 
revenue. 
< TABLE 4 NEAR HERE > 
 
6. Conclusions 
In the literature that explains the existence of procyclical expenditure, attention has focused on the 
importance of ‘voracity effects’ (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999). In this paper 
attention has focused on the proposition that fiscal illusion increases the likelihood of ‘voracity 
effects’. With ‘voracity effects’, political pressures to increase public expenditure are more intense 
as national income increases. In this paper, it has been argued that the ‘intensity’ of political 
pressures depends on the way they are received (as well as on the way that they are exerted). 
Vote-maximising politicians are more inclined to increase public expenditures when they believe 
they are able to increase expenditures, without alarming voters that there is an increase in taxation.  
There are two sources of fiscal illusion that increase the likelihood of ‘voracity effects’. With 
high income-elasticities of sales tax revenue and dependence on intergovernmental transfers, voters 
are more likely to underestimate the costs of taxation as national income increases. The first testable 
prediction in this paper is that high income-elasticities of sales tax revenue and dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers increase the level of fiscal public expenditure (other things equal). 
The analysis of government spending in 36 US states between 1980 and 2000 produced 
results that are consistent with the proposition that high income-elasticities of sales tax revenue and 
receipt of intergovernmental transfers are important determinants of fiscal illusion. This is the first 
test (to our knowledge) of the relative importance of the full complement of potential sources of 
fiscal illusion (as described in this paper). It is also a test that has been designed to address the 
problem of endogeneity. The results are consistent with the proposition that high income-elasticities 
of sales tax revenue and receipt of intergovernmental transfers are important determinants of fiscal 
illusion.  
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 When reporting that some potential sources of fiscal illusion are not significant, the results in 
this paper are consistent with results reported by other studies of fiscal illusion. 9  The results also 
shed insight into the existence of the unresolved debate about the relevance of high income-
elasticities of tax revenue. Differences in empirical results that refer to the significance of high 
income-elasticities of tax revenue are likely to depend on the extent to which taxation is raised by 
direct taxation and by indirect taxation. The results in this paper indicate that voters are more 
inclined to underestimate the costs of taxation when taxation is raised by indirect taxation. 
The results that both high income-elasticities of sales tax revenues and intergovernmental 
transfers are relevant sources of fiscal illusion is important because, in this paper, the second testable 
proposition is that fiscal illusion also increases the cyclicality of government expenditure. Having 
addressed the issue of endogeneity, the results are consistent with the proposition that the level of 
public expenditure is higher than anticipated (other things equal) because voters under-estimate the 
costs of taxation. 
Turning to the second set of empirical tests reported in this paper, the proposition is that fiscal 
illusion will increase the level and the cyclicality of government expenditure. The first important 
observation (in table 3) is that the coefficient on the interaction term ( )i1it Ey ×∆ −  is significant and 
substantially larger than the coefficient on 1ity −∆ . The presence of high income-elasticities of sales 
tax revenue is important (other things equal) when explaining the likelihood that sub-central 
governments will spend procyclically. The second important observation (in table 4) is that the 
coefficient on ( )1it1it try −− ∆×∆  is significant (and higher than the insignificant coefficient on the 
volatility of income). As in other studies (e.g. Abbott and Jones, 2013), sub-central governments are 
more likely to spend procyclically the more they rely on intergovernmental transfers. For both 
income elasticities of sales tax revenues and intergovernmental transfers, the relative sizes of 
coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis that fiscal illusion increases the procyclicality of 
government expenditure over and above the inherent procyclicality in these sources of government 
revenue. 
                                                          
9 The results in this paper are consistent with results in other studies that question the relevance of other sources 
of fiscal illusion, e.g. Blom-Hansen’s (2005) assessment of the relevance of renter illusion in the Netherlands. 
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In this paper, the first set of results (correcting for endogeneity) indicate that fiscal illusion 
increases the level of government spending. The second set of results indicate that the same 
determinants of fiscal illusion (high income-elasticities of sales tax revenue and dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers) and their impact on fiscal illusion are also relevant when explaining the 
cyclicality of government expenditure.  
The tests in this paper are consistent with the proposition that myopic, vote-maximising 
politicians increase the likelihood of procyclical government expenditure by indulging pressures to 
increase governments expenditures in economic upturns (and by depleting the budgetary reserves 
that might otherwise have been employed to mitigate economic recession). While there are 
circumstances in which procyclical spending might maximise a community’s welfare, commentators 
are dismissive because the circumstance are very restrictive (Halland and Bleaney, 2009).10 As fiscal 
illusion is relevant when explaining the existence of government failure, the costs of fiscal illusion 
exceed the static misallocation costs that are associated with ‘excessive’ levels of public expenditure 
(e.g. Mueller, 2003; Cullis and Jones, 2009). Fiscal illusion also imposes costs because there is 
additional uncertainty if fiscal illusion creates ‘excessive’ cyclicality. Low-income individuals are 
vulnerable in economic recessions (e.g. Bordo and Meissner, 2011) and governments are not able to 
offer the levels of social protection that the vulnerable rely on in recessions.11  
With evidence that the sources of fiscal illusion that increase the likelihood of ‘voracity 
effects’ are important determinants of the level of public expenditure, fiscal illusion is also relevant 
when analysing the cyclicality of government expenditure.  
                                                          
10 Lane (2003) argues that there are circumstances in which procyclical government spending might maximise 
welfare if private and public consumption are complements. Alesina et al. (2008) argue that procyclical 
spending might increase welfare in developing countries because of the failures they experience in capital 
markets. 
11 While this paper has focused on sub-central governments, fiscal illusion is also likely to be relevant when 
explaining the difficulties that federal governments experience when they must take action to mitigate the costs 
of recessions (Abbott and Jones, 2012).  R.F. Harrod (Keynes’ biographer) stated that Keynes believed 
economic policy would be made by “…a small group of enlightened men…in accordance with the ‘public 
interest’” (cited by Buchanan and Wagner 1977: 84), but here the evidence is consistent with the argument that 
politicians’ own political ambitions may also be relevant when explaining the cyclicality of government 
expenditure. 
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Table 1: 3SLS regressions of the determinants of per capita current government spending 
 
    
 2000 1990 1980 
    
constant 2503.77 
(0.48) 
6918.12 
(1.62) 
307.81 
(0.38) 
State GDP per capita (Y) -0.147 
(-1.37) 
-0.128 
(-1.03) 
0.102 
(1.86) 
Federal aid per capita (F) 0.732* 
(2.09) 
3.534* 
(2.58) 
2.199* 
(4.02) 
Population over 65 (A) 83.484 
(1.10) 
-20.695 
(-0.61) 
3.362 
(0.33) 
Urban population (C) 46.157 
(1.30) 
6.848 
(0.59) 
2.727 
(0.63) 
Own revenue (S) -2070.55 
(-1.39) 
4382.91* 
(2.21) 
1070.10 
(1.86) 
State borrowing (B) -2.072 
(-0.42) 
8.791* 
(2.07) 
-0.535 
(-0.36) 
State Debt (D) 0.778 
(1.14) 
-0.404 
(-0.82) 
0.151 
(0.96) 
Gini coefficient (GI) -4472.64 
(-0.61) 
-14593.7 
(-1.67) 
-2701.68 
(-1.34) 
Government ideology (ID) 11.890 
(1.30) 
-1.781 
(-0.29) 
3.203* 
(2.31) 
Non-white population (NW) 11.739 
(0.89) 
7.652 
(0.97) 
3.653 
(1.78) 
 Sale tax elasticity (SE) 922.75* 
(2.07) 
269.77 
(0.94) 
-130.16 
(-0.86) 
Income tax elasticity PIE -148.64 
(-0.99) 
20.598 
(0.18) 
29.437 
(0.89) 
Herfindahl index revenues 
(RHF) 
7205.19 
(1.49) 
-1941.44 
(-0.48) 
-1356.18 
(-1.40) 
Owner occupation (OWN) -1458.61 
(-0.25) 
2611.21 
(0.99) 
-1455.33 
(-1.65) 
    
R2 0.125 0.264 0.605 
    
notes: Estimates produced using 3SLS estimation, controlling of for the endogenity of personal income and federal aid. The instrumented 
equations are not reported. T-ratios are reported in parentheses calculated from robust standard errors and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 2: Cyclicality equations 
 
    
  Adding ( )iit Ey ×∆  and ( )i1it Ey ×∆ −  Adding 
( )itit try ∆×∆  and 
( )it1it try ∆×∆ −  
 
  Sales Tax 
Elasticity 
 
Personal Income 
Tax Elasticity 
constant 0.087* 
(4.36) 
0.098* 
(5.01) 
0.102* 
(5.99) 
0.084* 
(3.60) 
1itg −∆  -0.151 
(-1.74) 
-0.141 
(-1.44) 
-0.184 
(-1.94) 
-0.197* 
(-2.41) 
2itg −∆  -0.051 
(-0.60) 
0.091 
(-1.18) 
-0.150 
(-1.86) 
-0.134 
(-1.50) 
ity∆  0.107 
(1.17) 
-0.288* 
(-2.24) 
0.094 
(1.03) 
-0.121 
(-0.62) 
1ity −∆  0.106
* 
(3.29) 
0.125* 
(2.42) 
0.137* 
(2.69) 
0.179* 
(4.41) 
( )iit Ey ×∆  - 0.011 
(0.16) 
0.039 
(1.62) 
- 
( )i1it Ey ×∆ −  - 0.343* 
(1.98) 
-0.076 
(-1.67) 
- 
(∆yit × ∆trit) - - - 0.676 
(1.17) 
(∆yit-1 × ∆trit-1) - - -  3.23
* 
(2.89) 
itbr∆  -0.0004 
(-0.21) 
-0.0015 
(-0.65) 
0.00002 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
(-1.12) 
1itbr −∆  0.002 
(1.35) 
0.002 
(1.19) 
0.003 
(1.73) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
     
N×T 1059 894 849 810 
     
No. of 
instruments 
69 72 72 72 
     
SC(1) -5.49* -5.30* -5.10* -4.66* 
SC(2) 0.34 1.13 1.53 0.27 
SC(4) 0.60 0.27 0.29 1.53 
     
Hansen test of 
over id. rest 
χ2(43) 
26.01 17.37 16.88 15.85 
     
Notes: Estimates of the cyclicality equation derived using the SYS-GMM dynamic panel data estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) (estimates 
of the time dummy coefficients are also generated but not reported to conserve space). The number of instruments displayed refers to the 
number of lagged values of the regressors (in level and first difference form) that are used as instruments for the explanatory variables. SC 
denotes the tests for serial correlation at 1st, 2nd and 4th order. The autocorrelation tests are for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. 
The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is reported, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. * indicates significance at 
the 5% level (t-ratios from robust standard errors are shown in parentheses). 
 
